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As the global ﬁnancial system has evolved since 1971, ﬁnancial histori-
ans have become increasingly struck by similarities between the stresses and
setbacks that have occurred in international ﬁnancial markets and those
that plagued earlier attempts at creating a global ﬁnancial system. The
decade of the 1990s was beset by exchange rate crises in Asia and melt-
downs of emerging markets in the former centrally planned economies.
Likewise, the decade of the 1890s a century earlier saw a series of ﬁnancial
crises that threatened to become systemic at times. Just as the booming U.S.
capital markets in the late 1990s seemed to help stabilize the international
ﬁnancial system at the time, so did the ﬂurry of new activity in the London
Stock Exchange promote a rise of international liquidity in the late 1890s.
Just as leading commentators on the state of ﬁnancial markets at the end of
the twentieth century argued that the provision of liquidity to ﬁnancial
markets by the actions of the U.S. Federal Reserve System only made the
dangers of ﬁnancial fragility more serious when the markets inevitably col-
lapsed, so did serious analysts, especially R. H. Palgrave (1903), criticize
the actions of the Bank of England in the 1890s.
The similarity between the ﬁnancial pressures and varied responses of
participating countries to the emergence of global capital markets in the
1890s and 1990s has not gone unnoticed by economic historians. Bordo and
Eichengreen (1999) look systematically at the characteristics of crises par-
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of the National Bureau of Economic Research.ticularly in the gold standard period to determine the extent to which infer-
ences may be drawn about the roles of capital mobility, ﬁxed exchange rates,
and ﬁnancial regulation in those earlier crises. Bordo and Schwartz (1999)
have made a useful catalog of crises, distinguishing between banking crises
that interrupt the internal payments system and currency crises that disrupt
the external payments relations. Kindleberger (2000)1has provided a check-
list of ﬁnancial crises going back to the tulip mania of 1636 in Holland and
up to the Asian crisis of 1997 and the subsequent Russian and Brazilian
crises in 1998.
The interpretations placed on these historical experiences of interna-
tional ﬁnancial crises by the respective authors reﬂect, ultimately, their
judgments whether today’s global ﬁnancial market needs an international
lender of last resort (Kindleberger) or a time-consistent set of monetary
rules among the participating countries (Bordo). If contagion, the spread
of a ﬁnancial crisis from the country of origin to innocent trading partners
or geographical neighbors whose ﬁnancial fundamentals are sound, is a
frequent consequence of a ﬁnancial crisis, then surely a lender of last resort
is a good idea. Injection of liquidity at the appropriate time in the center of
the crisis could forestall scrambles for liquidity from trading partners or al-
lies. If, on the other hand, crises spread mainly because trading partners
have either weak currencies or fragile banking systems, then credible com-
mitments to a sound currency and conservative banking practices need to
be acquired by countries participating in a global ﬁnancial system. Lurking
behind each viewpoint is a historical judgment call: Either the conse-
quences of ﬁnancial crises are so dire they should be averted when at all pos-
sible, or they provide useful learning experiences that can lead to ever
sounder ﬁnancial and monetary systems. Relying on a lender of last resort
to bail out one’s unwise or risky loans, by contrast, removes the incentives
for developing either sound ﬁnancial institutions or monetary arrange-
ments.
The classic account of ﬁnancial contagions, Kindleberger’s Manias, Pan-
ics, and Crashes (2000), presents a standard pattern in which speculative
fevers are caused by the appearance of new, unusually proﬁtable investment
opportunities. Often, the new opportunities accompany movements to-
ward globalization as new markets or technologies appear that can be ex-
ploited by a given country or by an economic sector in several countries.
Prices of the new assets that are created in response to the new opportunity
are driven to unsustainable heights; panic eventually occurs and investors
then scramble to withdraw their funds, not only from the original market
but also from any other market that resembles it. The renewed possibilities
of contagion in the global capital markets of the twenty-ﬁrst century have
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1. Reﬂecting the renewed interest in ﬁnancial crises and contagion, this work came out in its
fourth edition in November 2000.created concerns for national policymakers and for international organiza-
tions charged with maintaining order in the international marketplaces
(e.g., Baig and Goldfajn 1999; Classens and Forbes 2001).
Countering these concerns with contagion in ﬁnancial markets, aca-
demic economists have distinguished between “contagion” and “interde-
pendence.” Propagation of a ﬁnancial shock from the origin economy to
one or more host economies may occur through the channels of short-term
credit ﬂows if the economies are interdependent by virtue of substantial
trade with each other and substantial investments in each other (Frankel
and Rose 1998). Contagion, however, should not be restricted to economies
that are relatively insular, as even normally interdependent economies with
substantial ﬂows of trade and factor movements with each other may be
subject to contagion—if propagation of the ﬁnancial shock is more rapid
and widespread than reactions to normal ﬂuctuations in trade and capital
movements. Noting that recent ﬁnancial crises in the late 1990s created in-
creased turbulence in related markets, they ask whether the increase in cor-
relation among, say, bond prices or stock market indices that accompanied
the Asian ﬁnancial crisis starting in July 1997 was due simply to the statis-
tical eﬀect that an increase in variance of two variables will raise their
measured correlation. If, after adjusting for the eﬀect on correlation of
increased variance, there is no increase in correlation among the ﬁnan-
cial markets after a crisis, the case for contagion disappears (Forbes and
Rigobon 1999). All that remains, then, is the normal responses to each
other’s diﬃculties that will arise among interdependent economies. So also,
presumably, the case for a lender of last resort would disappear. The force
of this argument depends on whether one thinks that prior interdependence
was a good thing, enlarging the country’s production possibilities, rather
than a bad thing, simply setting it up for a fallout from a crisis in any of its
trading partners. If a good thing originally, then common lessons learned
should be beneﬁcial as well and not averted. Another possibility is that in-
terconnected countries are struck by a system-wide shock that has similar
eﬀects on each country—for example, the oil shocks of the 1970s on the oil-
importing countries. Whether a lender of last resort would have coped bet-
ter with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel
than the learning experience that actually occurred depends on one’s ap-
praisal of the consequences of the crisis and then of the lessons learned.
Below, we consider Kindleberger’s historical examples of international
crises and contagion in chronological sequence, asking in each case (a) what
is the evidence for contagion, judged by the standards set by analysts of the
crises of the 1990s, and (b) what were the consequences of the crisis for the
evolution of ﬁnancial and monetary systems? The crises considered are
the tulip mania of 1637, the Mississippi and South Sea bubbles of 1719–20,
the Latin American debt crisis of 1825, the international crisis of 1873, the
Barings crisis of 1890, the stock market crises of 1893, the panic of 1907, the
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berger picks on the crises of 1720, 1873, 1890, and 1929 as cases of interna-
tional ﬁnancial crises whose consequences were especially severe and there
was no lender of last resort (Kindleberger, 2000, 207).2 We deal with other,
minor episodes in passing, but pay special attention to the crises of 1873,
1890, 1893, and 1907 using new, high-frequency data from a wide range of
ﬁnancial markets in those years of the classic gold standard. These also hap-
pen to be the same international ﬁnancial crises identiﬁed by Goodhart and
Delargy (1998) as yielding analogies to today’s ﬁnancial crises. As we shall
see, the evidence for contagion is mixed, as is the evidence for learning. His-
torical circumstances count for a great deal, today as in the past, but we in-
sist that learning has occurred and can continue to occur. Implementation
of the institutional reforms required to avert ﬁnancial crises in the future,
however, depends upon the political will and sense of common peril among
policymakers.
10.2 The Tulip Mania of 1636–37
The ﬁrst ﬁnancial crisis of note after the European “discoveries” of the
trading and exploitation possibilities in the rest of the world—especially
the West Indies, the East Indies, and Africa—was the tulip mania in Hol-
land, 1637 (Garber 2000). Despite the attention paid to this episode by the
chroniclers of human folly, Garber’s analysis of this dramatic episode re-
duces it to a month’s worth of idle speculation by burgers conﬁned to bars
in the city of Haarlem at the height of the Thirty Years’ War during an out-
break of the plague. These individuals, short of capital and long on leisure,
knowingly made unenforceable bargains on common tulips for delivery in
six months. In fact, their bargains were not enforced, save at 3.5 to 10.0 per-
cent of the original amount, for those traders wishing to continue in the
tulip business afterward. Such capital as was bound up in these futures con-
tracts, however, was seen by the authorities as a diversion from more useful
investments in government bonds to continue ﬁnancing the Dutch war
eﬀort. The government’s hostility to such private uses of funds during
wartime accounts for the negative press that the tulip mania received at the
time, which has been continued by generations of historians ever since.
In Garber’s economic analysis, however, the prices usually quoted as ex-
amples of speculative excess were, indeed, normal for ﬁrst-generation bulbs
of unusual beauty that could be used to reproduce generations of subse-
quent blooms, which naturally fell sharply in price as production grew.
Later markets for bulbs in normal times, whether for tulips or hyacinths,
show similar high prices for the originals and rapid declines afterwards.
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2. Kindleberger also points to the domestic crises of 1882 in France and 1921 in Britain
where no lender of last resort acted, but these were limited to the country of origin.Furthermore, there seems to have been no contagion to other ﬁnancial cen-
ters from the tulip speculation as such, although the ﬁnancial demands of
the Thirty Years’ War upon the commercial cities and towns of the Euro-
pean continent created disruptions as well.
While Kindleberger leads oﬀ his chapter on “Domestic Contagion” with
a critique of Garber’s analysis (Kindleberger 2000, 109–10), the evidence he
cites from other secondary works emphasizes the general prosperity of the
Dutch republic after the mania had passed and prices had collapsed. The
inference he draws implicitly is that building canals and luxury residences
were also silly speculations by the Dutch. Most historians, and contempo-
raries, however, attribute the prosperity of the Dutch in this “golden age” to
the proﬁts they extracted as an entrepôt for Protestant forces in northern
Europe during the Thirty Years’ War, 1618–48. Especially beneﬁcial was
their monopoly of the Baltic trade as they circumvented the Spanish block-
ade to the Mediterranean and even established trading colonies in the West
Indies (Israel 1995). The closest thing to contagion was speculation in other
commodity derivatives in the summer of 1636 in other Dutch towns, but
these, like the tulip mania in Haarlem, are attributed to the outbreaks of
plague and the quarantines imposed by municipal authorities on traveling
merchants (de Vries and van der Woude 1997, 150–51).
The main outcome of the ﬁnancial crises attending the Thirty Years’ War,
however, was the promotion of lasting ﬁnancial innovations, creating per-
petual or life annuities that could be easily transferred to third parties.
These were issued by individual cities in northern Europe that were forced
to pay kontributionen to warlords maintaining armies in their vicinity
(Redlich 1959). When the armies moved on, leaving the structures of the
town intact if the payment had suﬃced, the town’s debts remained but were
serviced indeﬁnitely from the local tax base. Eventually, these were mar-
keted to citizens in adjacent towns and cities as well, laying the basis for the
“ﬁnancial revolution” in public ﬁnance of the later seventeenth century
(Tracy 1985). The lessons learned by the Dutch were evident in their em-
phasis on promoting overseas trade by maintaining a joint stock company
for the Asian trade (the Dutch East India Company), unifying the mint
standards of the provinces, facilitating merchant payments through a
public exchange bank in Amsterdam, and assigning speciﬁc excise taxes for
the service of government debts issued mainly by the individual cities and
provinces (Neal 2000). The golden age of the Dutch Republic ensued, the
contagion of the tulip mania safely contained.
10.3 The Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles of 1719–20
Nearly a century after the tulip mania in Holland, the French and British
governments created the Mississippi and South Sea bubbles, stock market
schemes designed to reduce the burden of debt service, given weak govern-
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swap the bulk of their outstanding debt for equity in large joint-stock trad-
ing companies with monopoly privileges—the Mississippi Company (Com-
pagnie des Indes) in France and the South Sea Company in Great Britain.
Both eﬀorts had the full support of the government currently in power, and
both were successful ultimately in reducing the respective debt burdens, at
the expense of debt holders who delayed converting their debt holdings or
who failed to sell out their equity holdings before the crash. The two
schemes were connected through international capital movements, as in-
vestors from both the Netherlands and Great Britain were ﬁrst attracted to
John Law’s investment opportunities in France from July to December
1719, and then to the rising stock markets in London from March to Sep-
tember 1720. By October 1720, however,  both schemes had collapsed,
thanks mainly to the total disruption of the European payments system in
the summer of 1720. This was caused mostly by Law’s eﬀorts to rescue his
system from the dangers of capital ﬂight (by letting the French currency de-
preciate rapidly, he hoped to induce speculative inﬂows in anticipation of
the revaluation that would follow), but complicated by the last outbreak of
the plague on the European continent and the quarantines imposed by mu-
nicipal authorities.
Much has been made of the supposed contagion of irrational speculation
that swept across northern Europe in these two years (Kindleberger 2000,
77–78, 122–29; Chancellor 1999, chap. 3), but recent work by economists
has reduced both to essentially rational, if premature, schemes to relieve
pressure on government ﬁnances (Neal 1990; Murphy 1997; Carswell
1993). The lesson of history is not that contagion occurred, but that the two
countries suﬀered a common shock—the excessive debt created by the
enormous expenses of the War of the Spanish Succession.
The aftermath of the bubbles, however, laid the basis for the rise of an in-
ternational capital market, increasingly centered in the city of London.
Most important for the future success of the capital markets in Great
Britain, the huge mass of illiquid “Irredeemable Ninety-nine Year Annu-
ities” that had constituted the major part of British national debt in 1719
had been largely converted by 1723 into liquid, easily tradable, and trans-
parently priced South Sea annuities. This greatly enlarged mass of tradable
ﬁnancial assets in the secondary market for securities in London preserved
an active stock market in London, more than oﬀsetting the eﬀects of the
Bubble Act of 1720.
The Bubble Act eliminated dealing in a welter of bubble companies that
had sprung up in the previous speculative boom, but does not seem to have
eliminated continued use of the joint-stock company for ﬁnancing the
continued expansion of British infrastructure—turnpikes, canals, docks,
and waterworks (Harris 2000). The basic outlines of the Anglo-American
structure of ﬁnance were set by 1723—a complementary set of private
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liquid secondary market for ﬁnancial assets, especially government debt.
The South Sea Bubble proved to be the “big bang” for ﬁnancial capitalism
in England. In 1726, even the Bank of England had to acknowledge the suc-
cess of the South Sea Company’s 3 percent perpetual annuity when it issued
its own “Three Per Cent Annuity.”
Unfortunately for France, the collapse of the Mississippi Bubble there in
1720 proved to be the end of secondary markets for ﬁnancial assets in that
country (Hoﬀman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal 2000). In the inﬂation that
had accompanied Law’s eﬀorts to create a market for the Mississippi Com-
pany shares, French debtors had repaid their bonds in depreciated cur-
rency, inﬂicting large and long-lasting losses on French creditors. Only a
limited market for private debt arose after the currency reform of 1726, and
that was a primary market mediated by the public notaries in Paris (Hoﬀ-
man and Rosenthal 1995). Amsterdam’s capital market survived the col-
lapse of the minibubbles that had popped up there at the end of 1720, but
continued to be fragmented among the various bonds issued by the Gener-
alitet of the United Provinces and the individual cities and provinces. Only
the shares of the new marine insurance company created in response to the
ﬁnancial innovations in Paris and London remained as a new investment
opportunity for Dutch savers. For the most part, they focused ﬁrst on the
increasing issues of national debt created by the British government (Dick-
son 1967) and then on bonds issued by various European governments af-
ter mid-century (Riley 1980). The British, French, and Dutch governments
learned diﬀerent lessons from the ﬁrst international ﬁnancial crisis.
10.4 After the Bubbles
Financial crises in the remainder of the eighteenth century were caused
by shocks from the aftermath of war ﬁnance, but usually had quite diﬀerent
eﬀects among the ﬁnancial centers of London, Amsterdam, and Paris. Dur-
ing the Seven Years’ War (1756–63), which caused bankruptcies among the
public notaries in Paris and put an end to the eﬀorts of the most enterpris-
ing to become de facto bankers, the most spectacular military victories won
by the British were in India. The territorial gains there and rewards by grate-
ful Indian princes yielded the promise of greatly increased proﬁts for the
East India Company. Speculation could be ﬁnanced in Amsterdam by
drawing bills of exchange on the basis of credits expected from the Bank of
England as it remitted bills payable in Amsterdam to support its mercenary
troops on the Continent, as well as the troops of Frederick the Great. This
led to wisselruiterij,a Dutch version of check-kiting (writing checks on a de-
mand deposit before the check has cleared for the original deposit), that
came to a sudden and widely embarrassing halt in 1763. A chain of bank-
ruptcies then occurred in Amsterdam and Hamburg, where the British sub-
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crisis was short-lived and focused on the least reputable bankers. London
bankers, who had not been involved in wisselsruiterij, perhaps due to a lack
of opportunity or in sophistication in the use of the Wisselbank’s facilities,
sent large shipments of specie to their most reliable correspondents. The
London bankers and the Bank of England also temporarily suspended re-
quests for payment of their bills in Amsterdam. The connections between
the sources of public credit for the British government and the instruments
of private credit for foreign trade between London and Amsterdam were
thereby sustained and even strengthened.
A similar liquidity crisis, however, occurred again in 1772, also the result
of speculation on East India Company stock. But the only response in the
Amsterdam ﬁnancial sector this time was to patch together a Loan Bank to
serve as a form of deposit insurance by helping to recapitalize merchant
banks that were temporarily illiquid. Even the connections with the Lon-
don capital market were weakened as Dutch rentiers withdrew their hold-
ings of British national debt in favor of seeking placements in other Euro-
pean government debt (Riley 1980). 
The learning experience of these ﬁrst stock market bubbles and crashes
varied, then, depending whether we take Great Britain, France, or the
Netherlands as our object of study. While Kindleberger asserts that the con-
sequences were prolonged and destructive to all three economies, economic
historians remark that the following quarter-century was one of remarkable
prosperity for all three countries, chieﬂy due to the absence of major war
until the War of the Austrian Succession (Tracy 1990). The French ﬁnancial
system was weakened permanently, however, while the British beneﬁted
from the creation of a liquid secondary market for successive issues of its
national debt and the Dutch connection with London beneﬁted both (Neal
2000). The case for a lender of last resort is strongest in the French experi-
ence, weakest in the British, unless one thinks of the reorganization of the
South Sea Company in 1723 as a delayed action of a reluctant lender of last
resort—the Bank of England acting under political duress from the ad-
ministration of Robert Walpole.
10.5 The First Latin American Debt Crisis in 1825
After the disruptions to ﬁnancial markets caused by the French Revolu-
tion and the wars that ensued until 1815, the London stock exchange
emerged as the dominant capital market in the world. The ﬁrst foray of
British investors into international ﬁnance, however, ended in disaster with
the crash of 1825. The origins of the 1825 crisis began with the withdrawal
of foreigners from the British national debt after the war. Following the ﬁ-
nal defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, capital ﬂowed back to the Eu-
ropean continent from Great Britain. Foreign holdings of British debt di-
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prices of Bank of England and East India stock rose in tandem. British in-
vestors, used to safe returns ranging between 4 and 6 percent for the past
twenty years now, found their options limited to yields between 3.5 and 4.5
percent. The opportunities for investment in new issues of French 5 percent
rentes were more attractive than continuing their holdings in consols. In-
deed, the rentes maintained a steady return over 5 percent throughout the
crisis period and oﬀered a stable alternative to the British funds.
Baring Brothers and Co., by its successful ﬁnance of Wellington’s army
in 1815, had established itself as the dominant merchant bank in England.
By undertaking the ﬂotation of the ﬁrst two issues of French rentes sold to
pay the reparations and support Wellington’s occupation forces, Barings
became the “Sixth Power” in Europe, according to the Duc de Richelieu
(Jenks 1927, 36).3 From February to July 1817, Barings disposed of three
loans, the ﬁrst two at a net price of 53 for 100 million francs each and the
third at 65 which raised 115 million francs. Yet, according to the historian
of the Baring ﬁrm, no disturbance in the British trade balance or in French
reserves seems to have occurred—the inﬂow of capital to France from
Great Britain from the issue of rentes seems to have been oﬀset by indem-
nity payments and army contracts from France to Great Britain (Jenks, 37).
(What the historian has missed, of course, is the fall in the exchange rate of
the British pound that occurred at the time; the pound was still ﬂoating af-
ter the suspension of convertibility in February 1797.) From this success for
British investors in foreign investment with the French rentes, it has tradi-
tionally been argued, came increased enthusiasm for other forms of invest-
ment, ﬁrst in the bonds issued by the new government of Spain established
in 1820, and then in the bonds issued by the new states emerging in Latin
America.4
The collapse of Spanish control over its American empire during the
Napoleonic Wars led to the formation of a variety of independent states
from the former colonies by 1820. Battling one another for control over
strategic transport routes, mainly rivers and ports, and over state enter-
prises, mainly mines, each appealed to foreign investors as a source of gov-
ernment ﬁnance and as a means to substitute foreign expertise and tech-
nology for the vanquished Spanish. Their government bonds and their
mining shares found a ready market in the London Stock Exchange, which
had become the dominant marketplace for ﬁnance capital in the world dur-
ing the Napoleonic Wars. The loan bubble of 1822–25 ensued, eventually
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3. See also Ziegler 1990, 100–11.
4. While the focus for foreign loans was mostly on Spain and Spanish America, literature
buﬀs may be forgiven for thinking instead of Greece, which received a loan and much-needed
publicity for its then-premature eﬀorts to break away from Turkish rule. Over ﬁfty years later,
when the Greek government was attempting to assure the international community it would
go on a gold standard, part of its commitment was to resume payment on these initial bonds!giving British foreign bondholders their ﬁrst experience with defaults by
sovereign states. None of the new Latin American states emerging from the
remains of the Spanish empire (Brazil remained part of the Portuguese em-
pire) found the means, whether by exports or taxes, to service the debts they
had incurred in London. Meanwhile, they dissipated rapidly in military
conﬂicts with neighboring states the net proceeds they received after the
bonds were sold at discount and they had paid large commissions up front
to the London investment houses.5
From 1822, when both Chile and Colombia ﬂoated bond issues with
London agents, an increasing number of Latin American governments
tried to ﬁnd the means for ﬁnancing their transition to independence from
the ﬂush pockets of British investors. The bonds they issued, in terms of the
amounts actually paid up, as distinguished from the amounts actually re-
ceived by the governments, were the largest single category of new invest-
ment in the London capital market in this period (Gayer, Schwartz, and
Rostow 1975, 189). It is true, even so, that the amount was small relative to
the remaining sum of the British government’s funded debt—£43 million
compared to £820 million.6
Figure 10.1 compares the prices of several bond issues of the emerging
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5. Dawson (1990) provides a readable account of this episode, but Marichal (1989) puts it
into a longer run Latin American perspective. Brazilians point with pride that their bonds
never went into default, which is why their prices remained the highest among the Latin Amer-
ican bonds in the late 1820s. The Brazilian bonds, in fact, were the only ones issued by the
Rothschilds. None of their government bond issues for Austria, Belgium, Naples, Prussia, or
Russia defaulted in this period. (Doubleday, 1847, 281).
6. Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz (vol. 1, p. 408n. 8) and Mitchell (1962, 402). These are nom-
inal values in each case, but government debt was then trading at close to par, so its market
value was roughly the same.
Fig. 10.1 Yields of Latin bonds, 1822–27South American states, as given in James Wetenhall’s semiweekly Course of
the Exchange. At the peak of the stock market boom, there was surprising
convergence in the prices of all the Latin American bonds. It was only in the
ensuing two years that information on the ﬁscal capacity of the individual
governments and their respective economic bases enabled the London mar-
ket to distinguish among them. Mexico and the Andean countries were
clearly marked to be disaster cases by the end of 1828, while already Ar-
gentina and Brazil were demonstrating their attractiveness to British in-
vestors, an allure that would increase until the Barings crisis of 1890.
To see if this early ﬁnancial crisis is properly another example of conta-
gion, we have analyzed the cross-correlations of various asset prices in the
London Stock Exchange during the ﬁrst Latin American debt crisis in the
1820s, which led to the ﬁnancial crisis of December 1825. Using the prices
of the Three Percent Consol as the reference security, table 10.1 shows that
correlations were quite high before the crisis between the price of consols, a
general index of stock market prices, the price of French rentes (a seasoned
foreign security), and the ﬁrst Latin American bonds issued by Colombia
and Chile. After the crisis, correlations broke down and, contrary to the re-
cent stock market crises, the variance of the reference asset in this case ac-
tually declined. Consequently, adjusting for heteroscedasticity actually in-
creases the likelihood of ﬁnding evidence of contagion, but even so, the
hypothesis of contagion from the collapse of Latin American bond prices
to the stock market index, or mature bond markets, is resoundingly re-
jected.
The lesson learned by the British government in this case was to make
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French rentes 0.848 –0.197
Colombia 6% 0.881 0.328






Precrisis Postcrisis SE Precrisis SE Postcrisis Test
Index 0.914 0.724 0.166 0.282 –0.423 NC
French rentes 0.940 –0.327 0.139 0.386 –2.411 NC
Colombia 6% 0.955 0.513 0.122 0.350 –0.936 NC
Chile 6% 0.967 0.316 0.105 0.387 –1.323 NCmajor changes in the ﬁnancial structure of Great Britain, reforming the
bankruptcy law, repealing the Bubble Act of 1720, and forcing the Bank of
England to open branches in the major commercial and industrial cities,
while maintaining the gold standard and avoiding most Latin American in-
volvements for another quarter-century. If the Bank of England acted as a
lender of last resort, it was erratic, belated, and ultimately inadequate.7 In
the view of modern economic historians, however, this set the stage for the
true industrial revolution in the British economy—the beginning of sus-
tained increases in per capita income, increases sustained to the present
day. It may be, then, that other reforms in the ﬁnancial architecture of a
country can compensate for the absence of an eﬀective lender of last resort.
10.6 The Gold Standard Emerges
Meanwhile, European countries took note of the superiority of the
British public ﬁnancial system that Great Britain had conclusively demon-
strated during the Napoleonic Wars from 1803 to 1815. The lesson was
clear, but adapting the British system to Continental conditions was a slow
and painful process, marked by numerous setbacks as European govern-
ments clung as long as possible to their traditional ﬁscal regimes, monetary
standards, and ﬁnancial institutions. Over the course of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the individual European nation-states gradually moved as best they
could toward an imitation of the obviously successful British system of
public ﬁnance. Issuing perpetual annuities backed by the permanent taxing
authority of an elected parliament was a key element in the British system,
but the reigning monarchs of Europe only reluctantly ceded authority over
taxation to their parliaments.
Constraining the growth of the money supply with a credible rule such as
the gold standard was also important, not least to maintain the market
value of the debt issued by a government. But no country was willing to fol-
low the British example of a gold standard, set in 1821, until little Portugal
adopted gold as its monetary standard in 1854. Then it took the Franco-
Prussian War in 1870 to get united Germany to adopt a gold standard to re-
place the varieties of silver standards among the various German states.
France, and its major trading partners in Europe, persisted with the
bimetallic standard, maintaining a mint ratio of 15.5:1.0 of silver to gold
until 1871. Then, the ﬂood of German silver on the market as the German
Empire replaced the silver coinage with either gold or token coins led
France and the other members of the Latin Monetary Union to demonetize
silver, eﬀectively adopting the gold standard as well after 1879 (Flandreau
1996).
With the adoption by 1880 of a nearly universal regime of ﬁxed exchange
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7. Comments by Michael Bordo on Neal (1998).rates within Europe, a truly Europe- (and Atlantic-) wide ﬁnancial market
arose quickly, which came to encompass much of Latin America (Argentina
and Brazil) and Asia (India) as well as Australia (Gallarotti 1995). It served
well to ﬁnance an impressive surge of international trade as well as
labor and capital movements that remain benchmarks for today’s global
marketplace. The trade, labor, and capital movements of the period were
clearly driven by technological revolutions in steam-driven transport,
electrical communication, and agricultural mechanization (O’Rourke and
Williamson 2000). All of these epochal changes placed immense new de-
mands upon the international ﬁnancial markets as well, which in turn ex-
panded rapidly their depth and range of services.
While previous analysts have focused on either the bond market (Fergu-
son 2001; Bordo and Murshid 2000) as an indicator of long-term capital
movements, or on exchange rates as an indicator of credible commitment to
the gold standard (Bordo and MacDonald 1997), we have chosen to focus
on the open market interest rates for three-month accommodation bills,
which were reported weekly in The Economist newspaper. While the dis-
count rates at the public banks of issue on the European continent re-
mained sticky compared to the Bank of England, the open market rates
were much more responsive to market conditions. Table 10.2 demonstrates
dramatically how much more volatile were short-term interest rates on
three-month trade bills than the long-term interest rates on the respective
government bonds. For the ﬁve countries shown, the standard deviations of
the short-term rates we use for our analysis of the transmission of ﬁnancial
crises were several times greater than the standard deviations of the long-
term rates. In the cases of Great Britain and Germany, the diﬀerence was
nearly 10 times. In the statistical analysis below, we concentrate on correla-
tions of movements in interest rates in this short-term capital market. It was
the short-term capital market that had the greatest volume of trading activ-
ity, ﬁnancing not only the continually rising volume of domestic and foreign
trade arising from the transportation revolution of the steam age, but also
the temporary liquidity needs of ﬁnancial intermediaries. This so-called
“money market” was precisely where we expect pressures from liquidity de-
Crises in the Global Economy from Tulips to Today 485
Table 10.2 Interest Rate Volatility During the Classical Gold Standard Period,
1880–1914
Standard Deviation




The Netherlands 0.317 0.917
United Kingdom 0.217 1.17mands by banks to be expressed, raising discount rates when demands for
cash surged and lowering discount rates when the supply of cash was plen-
tiful. Indeed, even Kindleberger notes that it was the short-term capital
market that was the usual, and most eﬀective, transmission mechanism for
the examples of contagion he cites, which become exceptionally numerous
in this period (Kindleberger 2000, chap. 8).
The analysis below draws upon the extensive data set we have compiled
speciﬁcally for this study. The data set comprises weekly observations on
prices of long-term government bonds and interest rates on three-month,
prime-quality trade bills determined in national capital markets and the dis-
count rates charged by their public banks for fourteen countries over the
period 1 January 1870 through 27 June 1914 (see the appendix for a full
description.) Including over 100,000 observations, this rich data set, now
available to researchers, can be used for detailed analyses of the transmis-
sion process of ﬁnancial disturbances in the world’s ﬁrst global ﬁnancial
market. We use it in this study to focus on the issue of whether contagion
characterized the ﬁnancial crises of the gold standard period. Table 10.3
show the dates of the crises and the periods we analyze pre- and postcrisis.
10.7 The Crisis of 1873
We begin with the 1873 crisis, which is considered to have started in Ger-
many and Austria but was ampliﬁed by the repercussions in the United
States, still in the greenback period. Table 10.4shows the correlation coeﬃ-
cients between the market interest rates on call money in New York and, re-
spectively, Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam, Brussels, Vienna, and Petersburg, and
three-month bills in London.8Germany had just adopted the gold standard
formally, but was still in the process of replacing the silver coinage. Paris,
Amsterdam, Brussels, and Vienna were bimetallic but suﬀering the after-
shock of Germany’s switch from silver to gold and the ﬂood of silver com-
ing into their mints.
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Table 10.3 “Contagious” Crises during the Classical Gold Standard Period
Precrisis Postcrisis
Panic of 1873 21 September 1872–13 September 1873 20 September 1873–12 September 1874
Barings crisis  5 October 1889–27 September 1890 4 October 1890–26 September 1891
of 1890
U.S. Banking 8 October 1892–7 October 1893 13 October 1893–29 September 1894 
Crisis of 1893
Panic of 1907 22 October 1906–19 October 1907 26 October 1907–17 October 1908
8. All interest rate data for the period 1873–1914 were deseasonalized using the ESMOOTH
facility in RATS, which is based on the Holt-Winters exponential smoothing algorithm.The last column in table 10.4 indicates whether there is evidence of con-
tagion (C) or not (NC) between the London market rate and the market rate
of the country in question. None of the seven cases show contagion on the
Forbes and Rigobon criterion, after adjusting for heteroscedasticity, al-
though Austria does increase its correlation considerably while failing the
one-sided t-statistic test of  1.65. While we have taken the United States as
the source of the crisis, Kindleberger might well argue that Austria was the
source. It certainly was the weakest ﬁnancial sector, with the Austro-
Hungarian monarchy struggling with the aftermath of its defeat at the
hands of Prussia in 1866 and the triumph of the German reich establishing
a gold standard in 1871. Rather than a case of possible contagion, Austria’s
apparent response to the U.S. crisis can also be interpreted as a defensive re-
action in common with the United States to maintain their gold stocks in
response to German pressures.
These statistical measures of contagion are completely at odds with the
standard story of the 1873 crisis. According to Kindleberger, the crisis was
initiated by the speculative excesses in Germany resulting from the repara-
tions payments extracted from France after its defeat in 1870; the German
mania spilled over into Austria in 1871 and 1872. Both stock market bub-
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Precrisis Postcrisis SE Precrisis SE Postcrisis Test
France 0.409 0.232 0.135 0.143 –0.635 NC
Germany 0.073 0.146 0.147 0.146 0.248 NC
The Netherlands –0.050 0.147 0.147 0.146 0.674 NC
Belgium –0.008 0.263 0.147 0.142 0.935 NC
Austria 0.095 0.423 0.147 0.134 1.168 NC
Russia 0.134 –0.121 0.146 0.146 –0.870 NC
United Kingdom 0.409 0.232 0.135 0.143 –0.635 NCbles collapsed in May 1873, with contagion spreading to Italy, Holland, and
Belgium, eventually taking in the United States in September 1873 (Kindle-
berger 2000, 131–32). If that was a process of contagion, then we should
have found the correlation of Austria and the United States falling after the
collapse of Jay Cook’s ﬁrm in September 1873, not rising as it did. The panic
in the United States, which we take as the crisis point, was followed by a
worldwide depression in trade and economic activity that lasted until 1879
and that encompassed France and Russia, neither of which shared in the
initial euphoria and so were exempted from the crash.
The cases of Austria and the United States show that, even in the absence
of a lender of last resort or any close substitute for the actions of such a
lender, eﬀective steps were taken to limit their correlations with the epicen-
ter of the crisis, Germany in this case. Other unpleasant economic conse-
quences followed from their respective resolves to hasten deﬂation and re-
turn to a ﬁxed metallic standard (the United States in 1879 when the
economy picked up again, and Austria not until the early 1900s when it was
ﬁnally successful in shadowing the gold standard). Financial contagion,
however, was not, on our reading of the statistical evidence in the short-
term capital markets of the time, part of the picture, but the gold standard
system was incomplete, still in its formative years.
10.8 The Crisis of 1890
The Barings crisis of 1890 forced Portugal and Argentina oﬀ the gold
standard, while leaving Great Britain breathing a collective sigh of relief in
the ﬁnancial sector. Governor Lidderdale of the Bank of England coordi-
nated a swap of equity for debt among the major banking houses of Lon-
don so they could take over much of the Barings business while forestalling
a run on them by their clients. But as he admitted freely, his eﬀorts would
likely have failed had it not been for the pledges of support by the Banque
de France and the British government.9 What  seems surprising at ﬁrst
glance is that the gold centers experienced much more volatile market and
bank rates through these three crisis years than did the smaller, more vul-
nerable trading centers such as Vienna, Madrid, and Genoa. Figure 10.2,
panels A and B, highlights the contrast in performance by the respective
money markets of the core and periphery countries in Europe. The much
lower volatility of both the bank and market rates in the periphery countries
compared to the bank and money rates in the core countries persisted right
through the crisis year of 1890, the eﬀects of which are impossible to discern
in panel B.
The explanation of lower volatility in the periphery than the core cannot
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ybe that only the credit markets of the large industrial countries were aﬀected
by the crisis; trade intensity among the European continental countries was
still rising in the 1880s despite signs of reversal in the free trade movement
that had begun in the 1860s. It seems self-evident that the less advanced
countries were using their public banks to limit access to trade credit
through informal credit rationing. Their implicit capital controls were
clearly eﬀective, as their respective money markets mirrored faithfully both
the stable levels and the low volatility of the very stable bank rates. Bloom-
ﬁeld (1959, 28) identiﬁed the variety of informal capital controls that cen-
tral banks employed when under duress in the gold standard period, al-
though he hesitated to draw any deﬁnite conclusions about the policy
implications of his anecdotal evidence. Schumpeter, on the other hand, as-
serted that every commercial bank was assigned a ration and “such ration
was cyclically varied as well as currently revised” (1939, 651). The question
is whether the behavior of the periphery countries changed over time with
experience or with changes in circumstance?
We have even more data on short-term interest rates with which to ex-
amine the possibility of contagion from the ﬁnancial crisis of 1890, which
may have started with a banking crisis in the United States in October, lead-
ing to exacerbation of Barings’ diﬃculties with Argentina in November of
that year. Table 10.5 gives the results for twelve trading partners, most of
whom were on the gold standard at this point, the main exception being
Portugal, which left the gold standard in 1890. The only two cases of pos-
sible contagion are Russia and the United States, but again this may be in-
terpreted as a defensive reaction as in the earlier crisis of 1873. Russia did
not formally commit to a gold standard until the reforms of Sergei Witte in
1896. The correlations of short-term interest rates in these gold standard
markets with the London market were higher, typically, than in 1873 both
before and after the crisis of 1890, reﬂecting the increase in short-term cap-
ital ﬂows that accompanied the spread of the gold standard.
Our results can be compared with those reported by Bordo and Murshid
(2000), who analyzed the correlation patterns on government bond prices
for eight countries before and after the ﬁrst crisis in April 1890 when the
Banco de la Nacion stopped dividend payments, provoking a run on all Ar-
gentine banks, and then before and after the November failure of Baring
Brothers. Only in the case of Argentine and British bonds did they ﬁnd
an increase in correlations and then only after the April crisis within Ar-
gentina, suggesting the unlikely case that contagion spread from Argentina
to Great Britain, or that Argentine bonds became absorbed by the re-
organized and recapitalized Barings ﬁrm. Both their results and ours indi-
cate that the actions of the governor of the Bank of England in reorganiz-
ing Barings while supporting its depositors limited the fallout from this
crisis to the English banking establishment in the short run. It may have had
Crises in the Global Economy from Tulips to Today 491more widespread inﬂuences, however, in the medium and long run, due to
the interconnections of the various money markets that had arisen.
10.9 The Crisis of 1893
To see the longer term eﬀects of the 1890 experience we are fortunate that
another, more serious, more widespread ﬁnancial crisis struck in 1893. Pan-
els A and B of ﬁgure 10.3show how the short-term credit markets in Europe
responded to this crisis. The volatility of bank rates among the core gold
standard countries was nearly as stable during this crisis as in the periphery
492 Larry Neal and Marc Weidenmier




















Precrisis Postcrisis SE Precrisis SE Postcrisis Test
France 0.129 0.365 0.146 0.137 0.833 NC
Germany 0.284 0.506 0.141 0.127 0.825 NC
The Netherlands –0.099 0.173 0.147 0.145 0.932 NC
Belgium 0.454 0.586 0.131 0.119 0.528 NC
Italy 0.230 0.495 0.143 0.128 0.976 NC
Austria 0.392 0.418 0.136 0.134 0.098 NC
Portugal 0.454 0.299 0.131 0.141 –0.572 NC
Russia 0.031 0.519 0.147 0.126 1.786 C
United States 0.210 0.677 0.144 0.109 1.849 C
Denmark 0.028 0.169 0.147 0.145 0.482 NC
Australia –0.098 –0.319 0.147 0.140 –0.722 NC








































































































































































































































ycountries, most of whom were merely shadowing the gold standard at this
time. Portugal had abandoned it, Russia and Austria had not yet adopted
it, Italy was about to drop it, and Spain would never adopt it formally. The
real contrast in this crisis came in the open market rates, which, as in the
previous crisis of 1890, were much more volatile in the core countries than
in the periphery. We take this again as evidence that credit rationing was
eﬀectively administered in the periphery countries, implying de facto capi-
tal controls in the periphery, but exposure to external market pressures in
the core.
Additional evidence in support of our interpretation of the contrasting
results for core and periphery countries in Europe comes from the Aus-
tralian case in 1893. For Australian economic development, the crisis of
1893 has been interpreted as a major turning point. The large number of
branch banks that had ﬁnanced Australia’s “long boom” over the preced-
ing quarter-century had to suspend payments for varying periods during
the year 1893 and to consolidate services when they resumed. Despite the
internal turmoil that was occurring in the domestic payments system, the
discount rates in Melbourne, Sydney, and Adelaide remained rock solid
throughout that year and the following years. Indeed, the only sign of
trouble that we can pick up in our ﬁnancial data from The Economistis that
it stopped reporting the Australian data altogether in 1894. It was in Lon-
don’s bill market, where most of the Australian banks had their headquar-
ters, that the action occurred.
The crisis of 1893, originating in the United States with a banking crisis
combined with a currency crisis created by the Silver Purchase Act of 1893,
included Australia, Italy, and Germany in its extent, according to Bordo
and Eichengreen (1999). In the short-term capital markets, however, it ap-
pears to have created contagion in only three of the twelve cases analyzed
in table 10.6. Only the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland, apparently,
were aﬀected. All three small countries had essentially no correlation at all
with the very volatile call money rates of the United States before the crisis,
unlike Italy, France, and Austria. But after the crisis, their correlation with
U.S. call money rates shot up signiﬁcantly. The odd thing about this crisis,
however, is that the variance of the central capital market actually fell dur-
ing the crisis period compared to the precrisis period—from 0.442 to 0.255.
If we were to take the London three-month bill rate as the epicenter of the
crisis instead, we would still have the same problem—a decline in variance
so that the adjustment of the correlation coeﬃcient for increased variance
should actually be reversed, reducing the precrisis correlation. The same
conclusion, nevertheless, would emerge—somehow the crisis of 1893 in-
creased the interdependence of the short-term capital markets in the At-
lantic trading world for three of the smaller, but very open, economies in
Europe while decreasing it for the major economies of France, Italy, and
Great Britain.
Crises in the Global Economy from Tulips to Today 495We believe this may again be a defensive reaction limited to the smaller
countries with smaller gold reserves at their disposal, compared to the ma-
jor countries. This may be a further demonstration that the pressures upon
the gold standard’s viability as an international monetary system were be-
coming extreme by that time as the American and German economies ex-
panded rapidly and increased their holdings of monetary gold. While the
discovery of new sources of gold in South Africa and Alaska in the follow-
ing years eased the pressures overall from 1897 to the outbreak of World
War I, the ﬁnancial techniques developed by continental bankers in imita-
tion of the British example were also important. We return to this point in
496 Larry Neal and Marc Weidenmier




















Precrisis Postcrisis SE Precrisis SE Postcrisis Test
France 0.579 –0.429 0.120 0.133 –3.977 NC
Germany 0.302 0.303 0.141 0.141 0.002 NC
The Netherlands –0.188 0.935 0.145 0.052 5.702 C
Belgium 0.129 0.795 0.146 0.089 2.831 C
Italy 0.654 –0.753 0.112 0.097 –6.747 NC
Austria 0.540 –0.863 0.124 0.075 –7.063 NC
Portugal 0.295 0.196 0.141 0.145 –0.346 NC
Russia –0.101 –0.804 0.147 0.088 –3.002 NC
Switzerland 0.059 0.677 0.166 0.123 2.138 C
Australia –0.110 0.127 0.147 0.146 0.811 NC
India –0.243 –0.803 0.143 0.088 –2.424 NC
United Kingdom –0.221 –0.638 0.144 0.115 –1.574 NCour conclusion after examining the case, or not, for contagion in the fol-
lowing international ﬁnancial crises, starting with the one major interna-
tional ﬁnancial crisis during the period of gold inﬂation, 1897–1914.
10.10 The Crisis of 1907
After 1897, gold inﬂation relieved the pressures imposed upon monetary
authorities committed either formally or informally to ﬁxed exchange rates
under the gold standard system. Not only did currency crises remain on the
sideline, but the frequency of banking crises diminished as well. The crisis
of 1907, however, was very serious and its eﬀects widespread, extending
from the United States to Germany and Italy. Panels A and B of ﬁgure 10.4
contrast the results for the core and now a much expanded membership in
the periphery. Even with the greater numbers of centers reporting to The
Economist by this time, however, the same stability of bank rates and corre-
sponding market rates in the periphery countries remains in sharp contrast
to the volatility of market rates in the core countries. Moreover, bank rates
were more responsive in the 1907 crisis as more central banks began either
to imitate the practices of the Bank of England, or to take defensive mea-
sures in response to the bank’s frequent changes of discount rate.
In the midst of the gold inﬂation period, from 1897 to 1914, occurred the
most severe and widespread ﬁnancial crisis before World War I. No doubt
that its origin was the United States, but the ﬁnancial interdependence al-
ready developed within the gold standard area meant that its eﬀects were
quickly transmitted abroad. While the crisis that caught everyone’s atten-
tion was the banking crisis with the failure of the Knickerbocker Trust
Company of New York in October 1907, the ultimate cause of the crisis was
likely the San Francisco earthquake in April 1906.10 Naturally, the physical
destruction caused by the earthquake put immediate demands upon the ﬁ-
nancial resources of ﬁrst the Californian and then the U.S. economy. It was
not until October 1906, however, that these pressures were transmitted to
London, but then the pressures were sudden and overwhelming as over £50
million of gold were shipped in that month from London to the United
States. The cause was the reluctant decisions by British insurance compa-
nies to pay out on the claims lodged by their San Francisco insurees. While
the insurance companies had initially claimed that the losses of property in
San Francisco were caused by the earthquake, and not by the ﬁres that fol-
lowed immediately, so they were not liable for payments, they realized that
U.S. courts would certainly rule against them. They began payments in Oc-
tober, dealing with six months of accumulated claims.
The eﬀect was twofold: First, the Bank of England raised the discount
rate sharply; and second, when it lowered the discount rate in January 1907,
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)it refused to discount any bills originating from the United States. Ulti-
mately, this cut oﬀ New York trust companies from their usual source of
funds for ﬁnancing liquidity demands in the fall. The fall of 1907 saw an-
other large outﬂow of gold from London to the United States, and this time
the response was felt throughout the capital market, transmitting quickly to
Germany, France, and Italy.
Table 10.7shows how dramatic this ﬁnal episode of the gold standard was
for the global ﬁnancial system of the time. The increase in variance of short-
term interest rates in the London market was the greatest experienced in the
entire gold standard period. The evidence of contagion is nearly universal
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Precrisis Postcrisis SE Precrisis SE Postcrisis Test
France –0.432 0.735 0.133 0.100 5.014 C
Germany 0.477 0.842 0.130 0.080 1.744 C
The Netherlands 0.031 0.839 0.147 0.080 3.547 C
Belgium –0.112 0.863 0.147 0.074 4.412 C
Italy 0.274 0.799 0.142 0.089 2.282 C
Austria –0.069 0.749 0.147 0.098 3.345 C
Switzerland 0.350 0.857 0.138 0.076 2.369 C
United States 0.522 0.830 0.125 0.082 1.480 NC
India 0.200 0.084 0.144 0.147 –0.400 NC
Sweden 0.339 0.526 0.139 0.125 0.707 NC
Denmark 0.472 0.470 0.130 0.130 –0.009 NC
Spain 0.241 0.334 0.143 0.139 0.331 NCin Europe—only the Scandinavian gold bloc remained impervious, along
with the United States, India, and Spain. Forbes and Rigobon (1999) might
classify these results for 1907 as less an example of contagion, however, than
of an aggregate shock aﬀecting all the ﬁnancial centers of the gold standard.
The problem with that explanation, of course, is the anomalous case of the
United States, the very epicenter of the crisis. But this may be another case
where our statistical test is too rigorous, as the t-statistic of 1.48 is even
closer to the critical value of 1.65 than the case of Austria in 1873. If the U.S.
ﬁnancial market was subjected to special discrimination in this crisis, ex-
cluded from the London discount market precisely in the year before the
crisis of October 1907, the U.S. anomaly is explained. Eﬀectively, the U.K.
interest rate against the U.S. bills of exchange was inﬁnity.
We have, then, a historical example of what can happen when a country
is excluded from an interdependent ﬁnancial system precisely when its ﬁ-
nancial needs are greatest, as is always the case when a major, unexpected,
and unpredictable “bolt from the blue” hits an economy. When interde-
pendence is already high, attempts to shelter the rest of the international
system from an idiosyncratic shock in one ﬁnancial center are likely to
prove fruitless. With the beneﬁt of hindsight, we can see that the European
centers might have been better oﬀ if they had come to the aid of San Fran-
cisco, or their own insurance companies, promptly. Of course, if all the gov-
ernments concerned were nursing their reserves of gold in case a major war
were to break out, their actual reaction is understandable.
10.11 The Greatest Financial Crisis of All: 1929–33
The issues touched on in our discussion of historical crises are motivated,
of course, by our awareness of the tragic consequences of the Great De-
pression of 1929–33, which all analysts agree was initiated by a truly inter-
national ﬁnancial crisis and most acknowledge that the consequences—
economic, political, and social—were long-lasting and dire. Here is where
Kindleberger’s argument for a lender of last resort has its greatest force.
Thanks to cooperation between Montagu Norman, governor of the Bank
of England, and Benjamin Strong, governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, a working version of the pre–World War I gold standard had
been built up over the years 1924–28. While it worked, this “gold exchange
standard” provided the ﬁnancial basis for an expansion of international
trade and rapid economic recovery in the major industrial economies. But
when a liquidity crisis struck—basically because world agricultural prices
fell, making it impossible for farmers from the plains of Nebraska to the
pampas of Argentina to the steppes of Hungary to make payments on
thedebts they had incurred—there was no lender of last resort around. The
Bank of England was willing, but incapable with its limited resources, to
serve in this role. The Federal Reserve System of the United States was ca-
Crises in the Global Economy from Tulips to Today 501pable, but unwilling to play that role, given its dysfunctional internal deci-
sion-making procedures.11
Our view of this terminal crisis of the gold standard era is that the entire
period from the outbreak of World War I in late July 1914 until the collapse
of the Bretton Woods system of ﬁxed exchange rates in mid-August 1971
was the antithesis of globalization. The work of Jeﬀrey Williamson (1995)
on convergence of real wages, which made substantial progress in the gold
standard years and came to halt in the 1914–45 period, conﬁrms this view.
The study of capital movements and the various measures of capital mar-
ket integration by Maurice Obstfeld and Alan Taylor (1998) identiﬁes this
period as one of “de-globalization” as well. Only the brief interlude of
1924–28, which W. A. Lewis (1949) called “the ﬁve good years” in his his-
tory of the interwar period, had any resemblance to the global economy and
its methods of operation that had arisen in the half-century before World
War I—and that was based on a ﬂawed ﬁnancial structure that could not
have endured.12
From this perspective, which we share with Kindleberger, the key ﬁnan-
cial crisis was not the Wall Street panic in October 1929, but the failure of
the Kreditanstalt Bank in Austria, announced on 11 May 1931. The conta-
gion eﬀects in this crisis were the worst possible for globalization as they
consisted of payment defaults that led to a widening circle of exchange con-
trols and a downward spiral of international trade. But in terms of our in-
dicators of contagion, there would be little or no eﬀect, much as we found
for the crisis of 1873, at the beginning of the gold standard era.
Indeed, Bordo and Murshid (2000) ﬁnd a similar outcome in their anal-
ysis of correlations of bond prices for twenty-one countries before and af-
ter each of three crises they identify in the 1929–33 period. These are the
Wall Street crash in October 1929, Britain’s departure from the gold stan-
dard in September 1931, and the U.S. law passed in May 1933 that allowed
devaluation of the U.S. dollar. In general, they ﬁnd little evidence of conta-
gion, especially after adjusting for the increase in volatility of the British
bond prices after September 1931. The only cases that seem to show conta-
gion are Greece and Finland after the U.S. devaluation in 1933, but these
may reﬂect more the importance of U.S. holdings of Greek and Finnish
bonds than Kindleberger-style scramble for liquidity.
10.12 Lessons Learned from Deglobalization
Nevertheless, the lessons learned are still being discussed today. The idea
that the periphery countries always suﬀer relative to the core countries, a
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11. We hope this capsule summary captures the essence of Kindleberger’s (1986) argument,
expressed in his World in Depression, 1929–1939, as well as in Manias, Panics, and Crashes
(2000) and many other places.
12. Eichengreen (1992) is the classic analysis of the plight of the gold exchange standard.hint of which comes from the Bordo-Murshid (2000) ﬁndings, was articu-
lated most eﬀectively by Mihail Manoilescu, a Romanian economist ap-
palled by the damage Romania suﬀered as it tried to follow French advice
by staying on the gold standard as long as possible while rejecting oﬀers of
markets for its oil from Nazi Germany. Manoilescu’s ideas found a recep-
tive audience in Argentina, where Raul Prebisch, a young economist in the
central bank of Argentina, was similarly appalled at the damage to Ar-
gentina’s export economy caused by following British advice. Prebisch’s
ideas persisted long afterward, thanks to his inﬂuence in the Economic
Commission of Latin America (Love 1996).
After the failure of the World Economic Conference in 1933, the world
divided up into mutually exclusive trading blocs: the sterling area, with its
imperial preference; the reichsmark bloc, based on bilateral exchange
agreements; the Japanese-led “Asian co-prosperity sphere”; and the autar-
kic economies of the Soviet Union and fascist Spain, Italy, and Portugal.
These assorted regional trading blocs and the attempts by Nazi Germany
and imperial Japan to expand their regions to become entirely self-suﬃcient
were important elements in the economic background conditions that set
the stage for the tragedies of World War II. Whether all this could have been
avoided by a lender of last resort acting at the critical crisis (Wall Street
crash? Kreditanstalt collapse? Britain leaving gold? U.S. devaluation?)
seems doubtful.
What was needed, in Kindleberger’s view, was an economic and politi-
cal hegemon, a role willingly adopted by the United States after World
War II as it took the lead in establishing the Bretton Woods system, based
on the institutions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank, with increasing eﬀorts to make the patchwork General
Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade become eﬀective, eventually turning into
the World Trade Organization. The results of the Bretton Woods era, es-
sentially 1958–71 when it was fully functioning as planned, were remark-
ably good, as shown by Bordo (1993). In particular, ﬁnancial crises were
limited to the occasional currency crisis when a country, usually Great
Britain, could no longer sustain its dollar peg, but thanks to capital con-
trols these were conﬁned to the country of origin, so there was never an is-
sue of contagion. But the monetary basis of the Bretton Woods system—
the dollar exchange standard with the dollar ﬁxed in price relative to
gold—was also fatally ﬂawed, essentially because the costs of maintaining
political hegemony for the United States undermined its ability to act as
economic hegemon. After its sudden collapse in 1971, the disintermedia-
tion created by the worldwide inﬂation that followed led to the rise once
again of international capital markets, this time in a world of ﬁat curren-
cies and ﬂoating exchange rates, leading to a new series of international ﬁ-
nancial crises that began to emerge in the late 1980s as capital controls
were increasingly lifted.
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The Asian crises started in July 1997 with the collapse of the Thai cur-
rency, the baht, as the Bank of Thailand ran out of dollar reserves needed
to maintain its peg with the dollar. They quickly spread to other East Asian
countries including Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and, with a lag,
South Korea, making a strong case for ﬁnancial contagion in the global
capital market. IMF Staﬀ Papers and the World Economic Outlook have re-
peatedly referred to the Asian crisis as a prime example of “contagion.”
IMF loans made to Argentina and Turkey in 2001 were given credit for pre-
venting contagion’s spread from the ﬁnancial diﬃculties in those countries.
Further, recovery has been slow, complicated by political diﬃculties in each
country, although the sharp devaluations of each currency have moderated
the fall in gross domestic product.
The most powerful statistical evidence in support of the contagion hy-
pothesis is Baig and Goldfajn (1999). They use the criterion that if correla-
tions among countries’ ﬁnancial markets increase signiﬁcantly after a cri-
sis,  contagion has occurred. Analyzing the correlations among the ﬁve
aﬄicted countries for foreign exchange rates, equity market indexes, inter-
est rates, and prices of government bonds, both before and after the crisis,
they ﬁnd strong evidence of contagion in the currency and government
bond markets. They ﬁnd mixed evidence of contagion in the equity markets,
until they control for country-speciﬁc events and other fundamentals,
whereupon contagion appears to have occurred. Certainly, the ﬁnancial
press drew similar conclusions and it may be that managers of emerging
market mutual funds decided to cut back their exposures to all Asian mar-
kets, anticipating contagion in a self-fulﬁlling action.
Another argument, however, could be that all ﬁve countries were victims
of a common shock, namely the sharp rise in the value of the U.S. dollar rel-
ative to the Japanese yen, a rise that began in 1996. All ﬁve countries had
pegged their currencies to the dollar and in the early 1990s, when the dollar
was falling relative to the yen, all ﬁve had proﬁted by expanding their
exports into markets previously dominated by the Japanese. Several also
gained from Japanese investment in their economies as Japanese ﬁrms relo-
cated production facilities into Thailand and Malaysia. These advantages
turned to disadvantages when the dollar began to rise sharply against the
yen and the European currencies. This would not have caused a crisis by it-
self—Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong also had pegged their currencies
to the U.S. dollar—but the ﬁve crisis countries also had incredibly weak
banking systems caused by ﬁnancing long-term property investments with
short-term loans denominated in dollars.
A more substantive objection to the contagion scenario is due to the
work of Forbes and Rigobon (1999), who examine the cases of the U.S.
stock market crash in October 1987, the Mexican peso crisis in 1994, and
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Forbes and Rigobon adjust their postcrisis correlations for the increase in
volatility that also occurred and that upwardly biases standard measures of
correlation. Making the appropriate adjustment for heteroscedasticity in
their correlation measures, they conclude that for stock market indices, at
least, interdependence was already high before the crises in question and
remained high afterward, showing that contagion did not appear to have
been a factor even in these cases. If it had existed, the degree of correlation
among the stock markets would have increased after the crisis, independent
of the increase in variance. Moreover, they ﬁnd that when correlations
among stock market indices are adjusted for heteroscedasticity in the pre-
vious crises of 1987 and 1994, contagion does not appear to have been a fac-
tor then, either.
For example, calculating correlation coeﬃcients between indexes of
stock market values in twenty-seven countries during the East Asian crisis
of 1997, they ﬁnd evidence of contagion in ﬁfteen of the cases. Adjusting for
the increase in variance that occurred in the various markets after July 1997,
however, they eliminate the evidence of contagion in all but one case: Italy.
And that case is more likely due to Italy’s reentry into the European Mon-
etary System in November 1996, reducing exchange risk with the rest of Eu-
ropean stock markets, than to any psychological fears overtaking Italian in-
vestors.
Performing the same adjustment on correlation coeﬃcients among stock
market indices before and after two other major ﬁnancial crises—the Oc-
tober 1987 collapse of the New York Stock Exchange and the collapse of the
Mexican peso in late 1994—Forbes and Rigobon systematically eliminate
statistical evidence of contagion. Their conclusion is that “contagion is not
simply a high cross-market correlation after a shock. It is a signiﬁcant in-
crease in this correlation after the shock. The high levels of co-movement
across many stock markets during these three tumultuous periods reﬂects a
continuation of strong cross-market linkages, and not a signiﬁcant shift in
these linkages” (1999, 35). As they ﬁnd high levels of correlation before each
crisis as well as after, they direct our attention to the causes of interdepend-
ence across international equity markets even in periods of relative stability.
These cross-market linkages, they suggest, make today’s ﬁnancial markets
especially vulnerable to shocks. Kindleberger should approve of this con-
clusion, although he might shy away from substituting “interdependence”
for “contagion” in future writings.
Bordo and Murshid (2000) also examine the behavior of long-term gov-
ernment bonds for the Mexican peso crisis in 1994 and the Asian banking
and currency crisis of 1997. Like Forbes and Rigobon (1999), they ﬁnd little
evidence of increased correlation in government bond markets after each
crisis. The only case of increased correlation with the Thai government
bonds after July 1997 turns out to be Brazilian bonds and U.S. bonds
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that correlations with emerging market government bonds do increase rel-
ative to correlations with developed-country government bonds after both
the Mexican and Asian crises (tables 6A and 6B). As the current debate over
the IMF’s role as a potential lender of last resort continues, we are obviously
still extracting lessons from current experiences. What insight, then, might
be taken from our ﬁndings from the gold standard period when changes in
contagion occurred as the monetary environment changed from mild deﬂa-
tion to mild inﬂation?
10.14 Conclusion: Crisis Connections or Contagions?
Our formal analysis, above, of the correlations among the market short-
term interest rates before and after the three major crises of the gold stan-
dard period leads us to doubt that contagion was an important feature
then, even under a regime of ﬁxed exchange rates and open capital markets.
Rather, we conclude that diﬀerent rules of the game were appropriate for
diﬀerent players. Countries that had weak specie reserves and governments
prone to budget deﬁcits were well advised not to follow the example of the
Bank of England during crisis episodes. Rather than lend freely at a penalty
rate when the international markets were roiled by a credit crunch some-
where else in the world, they were better oﬀ maintaining their previous dis-
count rates so they could lend judiciously with side conditions to only the
most solvent of their customers. This surely inhibited risk-taking by the lo-
cal banking establishment, and probably retarded economic growth, but it
did preserve stability in the political sphere while coping with wrenching
structural changes in their economies. It also meant that ﬁnancial crises,
rather than increasing correlations among capital markets, actually tended
to decrease them.
Policymakers acting through the maintenance of discount rates estab-
lished by their respective public banks, therefore, had diﬀerent concerns,
which varied from country to country. Comparing the responses of the sev-
eral countries that eventually formed the basis for the ﬁrst global ﬁnancial
market to the systemic crises that struck from time to time, contagion ap-
peared less likely (1890) when the short-term capital markets had been al-
lowed to operate in an interdependent, well-integrated manner before the
crisis. Only when diﬀerences in interest rate patterns were attempted by
countries before a crisis by whatever means—diﬀerent monetary regimes,
informal capital controls, support of ﬁduciary issues—then an especially
severe crisis made common responses more likely to a common shock (1893
and 1907).
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Appendix
Country Description Data Availability
Bank discount rates
Austria 1 January 1870–27 June 1914
Belgium 1 January 1870–27 June 1914
Denmark 10 May 1884–27 June 1914
France 1 January 1870–27 June 1914
Germany Berlin bank rate 1 January 1870–27 June 1914
Italy Genoa bank rate 24 January 1885–27 June 1914
The Netherlands 1 January 1870–27 June 1914
Norway 6 January 1894–27 June 1914
Portugal 24 January 1885–27 June 1914
Russia St. Petersburg 1 January 1870–27 June 1914
Spain 6 January 1885–27 June 1914
Sweden 17 December 1892–27 June 1914
Switzerland 17 December 1892–27 June 1892
United Kingdom 1 January 1870–27 June 1914
Open market rates (three-month bills)
Austria 1 January 1870–27 June 1914
Australia Discount rate for Australian  10 May 1884–30 December 1893
banks operating in London
Belgium 1 January 1870–27 June 1914
Denmark 10 May 1884–27 June 1914
France 1 January 1870–27 June 1914
Germany Berlin open market rate 1 January 1870–27 June 1914
India Bombay bank rate 10 May 1884–27 June 1914
Italy Genoa open market rate 24 January 1885–27 June 1914
The Netherlands 1 January 1870–27 June 1914
Norway 6 January 1894–27 June 1914
Portugal 24 January 1885–27 June 1914
Russia St. Petersburg open market rate 4 February 1871–27 June 1914
Spain 6 January 1885–27 June 1914
Sweden 17 December 1892–27 June 1914
Switzerland 17 December 1892–27 June 1914
United Kingdom 1 January 1870–27 June 1914
United States Call money rate in New York City 27 November 1880–27 June 1914
Long term bond rates
Austria 5% silver rentes 2 January 1880–29 December 1899
4% gold rentes 2 January 1880–December 1913
Belgium 3% rentes 16 January 1885–21 October 1898
France 3% rentes 2 January 1880–31 July 1914
Germany Prussian consols (4% converted 31 December 1880–31 December 1909
to 3.5% 22 April 1898)
3% imperial 24 August 1894–26 December 1913
4% imperial 23 November 1894–26 December
1913
Italy 4% 2 January 1880–26 December 1913
The Netherlands 3% 25 August 1882–26 December 1913
Russia 5% 2 January 1880–31 July 1914
United Kingdom 3%/2.75% consols 2 January 1880–31 July 1914
United States 4% 2 January 1880–9 August 1907
4% (due 1925) 6 January 1905–31 July 1914References
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Comment Mark P. Taylor
The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed a spate of international
ﬁnancial and exchange rate crises, including the domino collapse of the Eu-
ropean exchange rate mechanism in 1992–93, the 1994 Mexican “tequila
hangover,” the Asian “ﬂu” of 1997–98, and the turmoil in emerging and
global ﬁnancial markets following the August 1998 Russian crisis.
Not surprisingly, this highly dramatic sequence of events led to the rapid
expansion of economics research into exchange rate and ﬁnancial crises.
Part of this research has been concerned with examining the nature of ﬁ-
nancial crises and developing methods for anticipating them and under-
standing the channels through which they tend to spread. Another, related
strand of research has tracked the policy debate that naturally followed,
concerning how best to deal with crises and their transmission at a policy
level and, in particular, the role of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF)—whether it should act as a lender of last resort and add liquidity in
times of crisis or whether its role is more to police sound macroeconomic
and ﬁnancial structural reform.
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Mark P. Taylor is professor of macroeconomics at the University of Warwick.Some, for example, would argue that the IMF seriously exacerbated the
1997–98 crisis in East Asia by calling for extensive structural reforms before
making adequate oﬃcial funding available, thereby delaying the restoration
of investor conﬁdence, allowing the collapse of the Asian currencies, and—
by insisting on a tightening of monetary policy—exacerbating the eﬀects of
the crisis by generating domestic credit crunches. On the other hand, those
advocating structural reform above all else might argue that this was a per-
fectly correct judgment call, since without structural reform oﬃcial fund-
ing would have been simply wasted—the IMF was just the unfortunate
messenger of some economic home truths.
On the sound principle that those who ignore the lessons of history are
condemned to repeat the mistakes of the past, Neal and Weidenmier pro-
vide in their paper a wide-ranging discussion of a set of well-known ﬁnan-
cial crises over the past three and a half centuries, ranging from the Dutch
tulip mania of the seventeenth century through the Mississippi and South
Sea bubbles of the eighteenth century, the ﬁrst Latin American debt crisis
of 1825, the 1873 crisis, and three crises of the international gold standard
period, before focusing their analysis on twentieth century episodes—ﬁrst
the Crash of 1929 and then some of the more recent crises mentioned in
the opening paragraph of this comment. They pay special attention to
three major crises that sprung up in the gold standard period of 1880–
1913, which they divide into an initial period of mild gold deﬂation from
1880 to 1896 and a subsequent period of mild gold inﬂation from 1897 to
1913.
They conclude that countries with weak fundamentals were well advised
not to follow the example of the Bank of England during crisis episodes, in
terms of lending at penalty rates of interest, but rather to pursue a policy of
“credit rationing” whereby they carried on lending at their previous dis-
count rates but only to their most solvent customers.
The paper is an impressive display of scholarship, although I do have
some misgivings about the clarity of the hypotheses tested in the paper. In
part, this results from the surprisingly slippery nature of the term contagion.
The authors deﬁne this early on as “the spread of a ﬁnancial crisis from the
country of origin to innocent trading partners or geographical neighbors
whose ﬁnancial fundamentals are sound.” In fact, however, contagion has
proved hard to pin down (see, e.g., Masson 1999; Edwards 2000; Corsetti,
Pericoli, and Sbracia 2002). Pericoli and Sbracia (2001), for example, list no
fewer than ﬁve deﬁnitions of contagion current in the literature.
In their empirical work, however, Neal and Weidenmier implicitly use a
deﬁnition based on the work of Forbes and Rigobon (2002). This can be set
out brieﬂy as follows. Let r it be the return on an asset at time t for the ith
country and let nit be a country-speciﬁc, or national, component. Then
Forbes and Rigobon assume a linear relationship between returns in the ith
country and returns in the reference country j of the form
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where  E(r itnit)    0 and the variance of idiosyncratic national shocks,
var(nit), is assumed to be constant across tranquil and crisis periods. The
country-speciﬁc coeﬃcients  i may be taken to measure the strength of a
country’s interconnection to country j. Thus we have
(2) var(r it)    i
2var(r jt)   var(nit),
and
(3) cov(r it, r it)    ivar(r jt)
so that
(4) corr(r it, r it)    i   .
From equation (4), however, we can see that the correlation of the two as-
set returns is increasing in the variance of the reference-country asset re-
turns. Thus, in times of increased volatility, correlations will rise. If this is
the case and the coeﬃcient  i has remained constant, Forbes and Rigobon
deﬁne this as interdependence, rather than contagion. If, however, there has
been a shift in this structural parameter brought about by the crisis—per-
haps due to herding or other eﬀects that force a disconnect—then this is
taken as evidence of contagion. In order to test whether the increase in cor-
relation is due to such a structural shift (contagion) or is due simply to a
common rise in volatility with the underlying structural link (1) constant
(interdependence), Forbes and Rigobon thus suggest a measure of correla-
tion that adjusts for shifts in volatility of this kind. In their empirical work,
the result is to downgrade a number of international crises from instances
of contagion to instances of interdependence (i.e., a nonzero but stable  i).
Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia (2002), however, argue that the results in
these papers reﬂect restrictive assumptions (restrictions on the country-
speciﬁc eﬀects) and that a more general speciﬁcation leads to a ﬁnding of
greater contagion. Drawing on the ﬁnance literature, they suggest a single-
factor model for r it and r jt of the form
(5) r it    i t   nit, i   1, 2, . . . m, i   j
(6) r jt    i t   njt,
where  tis the unobserved factor common to all of the countries under con-
sideration and  i is the country-speciﬁc factor loading. The terms nit and njt
again represent idiosyncratic national components. Substituting out for the
common factor in equation (5) using equation (6), we have
(7) r it      ir jt   n  it, i   1, 2, . . . m,
where
var(r jt)
   
 i
2var(r jt)   var(nit)
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Now, although equation (7) is superﬁcially of the form of equation (1), the
only case where this more general model collapses to the Forbes-Rigobon
setup is under the unrealistic assumption that the idiosyncratic national
component in the reference country is identically equal to zero, so that the
asset return in the reference country eﬀectively becomes identical to the in-
ternational common factor. Otherwise, at least two of the conditions that
are crucial to the results derived by Forbes and Rigobon are violated. First,
E(r itn  it)   0, and second, insofar as the reference country experiences in-
creased volatility at the time of the crisis, var(n  it) will not be constant across
tranquil and crisis periods. Both of these violations will tend to induce a
bias in the Forbes-Rigobon statistic, and although bias from the ﬁrst source
is diﬃcult to sign, bias from the second source will tend to bias the statistic
toward nonrejection of the null hypothesis of no structural shift (i.e., no
contagion; see Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia 2002 for further details).
The implication, alas, is that unless one is willing to make quite stringent
assumptions about the factors driving international asset returns, the
Forbes-Rigobon statistic may well be biased, and probably toward nonre-
jection of the null hypothesis. Hence, some of the empirical results derived
in Neal and Weidenmier’s paper may be brought into question.
While this is a shortcoming of the paper, it is not, in the present author’s
opinion, fatal, and it is one for which the authors should be exonerated—at
press time for this volume, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) had literally just
been published. Moreover, the verbal argument and the wealth of analysis
contained in the Neal and Weidenmier paper remain an impressive tour de
force and contribution to scholarship. Neal and Weidenmier have, more-
over, put together an important database for the gold standard period and
further empirical analysis therefore seems both warranted and possible.
Although the present author is clearly partisan, one way in which they
might fruitfully address the issues of interest is through the common-
vulnerabilities approach suggested by Mody and Taylor (2002). These au-
thors begin with a common factor model of the kind of equations (5) and
(6) and estimate the unobservable common factor using Kalman ﬁltering
techniques.1 As a step to understanding what movements in this common
factor are due to underlying macroeconomic and ﬁnancial similarities
across a region (the “common vulnerability”) and what part is unantici-
pated during a crisis (contagion) they then extract the “expected” changes
by relating the common factor to a vector of underlying (regional) macro-
economic and ﬁnancial indicators. As a result, they are able to assess the
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1. Mody and Taylor are in fact concerned with modeling movements in the exchange mar-
ket pressure index during the East Asian crisis, although their approach could be applied
equally to asset returns.underlying factors driving common vulnerability across a region. Since
Neal and Weidenmier are concerned with whether the countries they ex-
amine were prone to the spread of crisis due to weakness in the underlying
fundamentals, this may be a useful way to proceed with further analysis.
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